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Abstract 
  
This article argues that Australia’s recently-passed data breach notification legislation, the 
Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth), and its coming into force in 
2018, makes an internationally important, yet imperfect, contribution to data breach 
notification law. Against the backdrop of data breach legislation in the United States and 
European Union, a comparative analysis is undertaken between these jurisdictions and the 
Australian scheme to elucidate this argument. Firstly, some context to data breach notification 
provisions is offered, which are designed to address some of the problems data breaches cause 
for data privacy and information security. There have been various prominent data breaches 
affecting Australians over the last few years, which have led to discussion of what can be done 
to deal with their negative effects. The international context of data breach notification 
legislation will be discussed, with a focus on the United States and European Union 
jurisdictions which have already adopted similar laws. The background to the adoption of the 
Australia legislation will be examined, including the general context of data privacy and 
security protection in Australia. The reform itself will be then be considered, along with the 
extent to which this law is fit for purpose and some outstanding concerns about its application. 
While data breach notification requirements are likely to be a positive step for data security, 
further reform is probably necessary to ensure strong cybersecurity. However, such reform 
 should be cognisant of the international trends towards the adoption of data breach notification, 
but lack of alignment in standards, which may be burdensome for entities operating in the 
transnational data economy. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Australian Parliament finally passed legislation to implement mandatory data breach 
notification requirements in Australia in early 2017, the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data 
Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth).1 This legislation, which amends the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), 
establishes a notification scheme for certain kinds of data breaches, involving unauthorised 
access to, or disclosure of, personal information which is likely to lead to serious harm to the 
individuals whose personal information has been compromised. These measures can be 
conceptualised as pertaining to a larger body of law and policy in Australia concerning 
cybersecurity, which is emerging as a priority area for government and business with their 
growing reliance on digital technologies and data gathering.2  
 
This article examines the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth), and 
its context. Firstly, the phenomenon of data breaches will be explained, including some of the 
prominent recent breaches which have impacted Australian organisations and citizens. Then 
the concept of data breach notification laws will be introduced, with reference to existing 
measures in the United States (US) and European Union (EU). The focus will then turn to 
Australia, where existing privacy and information security laws relevant to breaches will be 
identified, before the new legislation is considered. The extent to which the new Australian law 
is fit for purpose and is in line with international best practice will be determined, before some 
concluding thoughts are offered. 
 
                                                          
1  Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth) (‘Notifiable Data Breaches Act’). 
2  See, eg, Chris Brookes, 'Cyber Security: Time for an Integrated Whole-of-Nation Approach in 
Australia' (Indo Pacific Strategic Papers, Australian Defence College, March 2015) 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/150327%20Brookes%20IPS%20paper%20-
%20cyber%20(PDF%20final).pdf>. 
Overall, the data breach notification requirements contained in Privacy Amendment (Notifiable 
Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth) are a welcome addition to the body of Australian legislation 
pertaining to data privacy and cybersecurity. However, this body of legislation cybersecurity 
requires a more comprehensive update to address privacy and cybersecurity threats, which data 
breach notification legislation alone is not able to achieve. Furthermore, the emergence of 
legislative data breach notification obligations in different globally prominent jurisdictions 
which are not harmonised may be burdensome from a compliance perspective for entities 
operating in the transnational digital economy. 
 
 
2. Data Breaches: Defined and Detailed 
 
In legislative data breach notification requirements, there are differing definitions of ‘data 
breach’ (especially from different jurisdictions or legislation pertaining to different industry 
sectors) but broadly speaking data breaches involve security breaches which lead to the 
disclosure, access or acquisition of information. Often data breach notification requirements 
pertain to information which is personal but this is not always the case. Such breaches can 
happen for a number of reasons, including malicious external hacks of stored data, insider 
threats in the form of information being accessed for an unauthorised purpose, and accidentally 
or as a result of human error or incompetence. Data breaches can also occur as a result of a 
physical media object such as a computer or hard drive containing sensitive unencrypted data 
being stolen or lost. Another scenario is the posting, whether deliberate or accidental, of 
sensitive data to a publicly-accessible website or on a computer accessible via the Internet. 
Verizon’s global Data Breach Investigations Report from 2016 found that 95% of breaches 
were attributable to nine patterns - most prominently miscellaneous errors, and insider and 
privilege misuse, which mostly affected the public sector, healthcare, information and 
administrative sectors.3 
  
Data breaches can involve information about identifiable individuals which falls within the 
definition of ‘personal information’ as per section 6(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (‘Privacy 
                                                          
3  Verizon, '2016 Data Breach Investigations Report' (Report, 2016) 4–6. 
Act’) in Australia, but can also involve information not about identified individuals or 
individuals who are reasonably identifiable that may fall within trade secrets protection or 
intellectual property protection.4 The amendments to the Australian federal Privacy Act, the 
‘Notifiable Data Breaches Act’, are concerned with data breaches involving personal 
information, which is thus the focus of this article.  
 
Data breaches are imposing significant costs on Australian businesses: the average cost of a 
data breach for a company has been estimated at $2.64 million.5 In 2016, 59% of Australian 
organisations detected a ‘business interrupting security breach on at least a monthly basis’.6 As 
mentioned above, there have been a number of recent cases of major data breaches involving 
Australia or Australians’ personal information in some way. One example is the major Yahoo 
hack, which involved 1 billion victims globally whose information had been compromised by 
hacks in 2013 (but the fact of the breach was only revealed in 2016), and specifically in 
Australia reportedly affected ‘thousands of Australian Government officials, including high-
profile politicians and senior Defence officials’.7 Another significant hacking event concerned 
the Ashley Madison website, a service for adults seeking extramarital relationships 
headquartered in Canada but operating globally, which culminated in a joint investigation by 
the Australian federal Privacy Commissioner and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada with each body finding infringements of its respective jurisdiction’s data privacy laws.8 
 
Other data breaches have involved Australian Government agencies directly. In 2014, the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection inadvertently published the personal details 
                                                          
4  See, eg, Elizabeth Rowe, ‘RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets’ (2016) 57 Boston College Law Review 
381. 
5  Ponemon Institute, '2016 Cost of Data Breach Survey: Australia' (Research Report, June 2016) 1 
<https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sel03094auen/SEL03094AUEN.PDF>.  
6  Telstra, 'Telstra Cyber Security Report 2017' (Research Report, Telstra, 2017) 2 
<https://www.telstra.com.au/content/dam/tcom/business-enterprise/campaigns/pdf/cyber-security-
whitepaper.pdf>, quoted in Commonwealth, 'Australia's Cyber Security Strategy: First Annual Update 
2017' (Strategy Paper, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017) 8 
<https://cybersecuritystrategy.dpmc.gov.au/cyber-security-strategy-first-annual-update-2017.pdf>. 
7  Benjamin Sveen, ‘Yahoo Hack: Email accounts of Australian Politicians, Police and Judges 
Compromised in Massive Breach, Dataset Reveals’, ABC News (online), 17 January 2017 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-17/senior-australian-politician-among-victims-of-massive-
yahoo-hack/8185162>. 
8  Australian Government Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Joint Investigation of 
Ashley Madison by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Australian Privacy Commissioner and Acting 
Australian Information Commissioner https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-
investigation-reports/ashley-madisonf 
of 9250 asylum seekers in a document online, which remained accessible for eight and a half 
days until it was discovered and removed.9 The Australian Government has recognised the data 
privacy concerns raised by such breaches, and also acknowledged that most of these breaches 
‘were not due to network compromises, but the rest of complacency and failures in the delivery 
and management of ICT services and information’.10 
 
Yet it is not only government agencies affected by data breaches. In 2016, what was described 
as ‘Australia’s largest security breach’ involved the personal data of 550,000 blood donors held 
by NGO Australian Red Cross inadvertently being publishing to a public website by the 
employee of a third party contractor.11 The federal Privacy Commissioner investigated the 
breach, and found breaches of the Privacy Act, specifically Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 
11 protecting the security of information.12 Due to the haste with which the Australian Red 
Cross responded to the breach and its actions to rectify the consequences of the breach, the 
Privacy Commissioner did not impose a fine and indeed identified the Red Cross’s response as 
a ‘model of good practice for other organisations’.13 In addition, Australian businesses 
including Aussie Travel Cover, Kmart and David Jones have also been the targets of malicious 
external attackers accessing data they held.14 
 
                                                          
9  ‘Immigration Department Breached Privacy of 9,250 Asylum Seekers by Publishing Their Details 
Online’, ABC News (online), 12 November 2014 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-
12/immigration-department-breached-privacy-of-9250-asylum-seekers/5885326>. 
10  Commonwealth, above n 6, 9. 
11  ‘Red Cross Blood Service Admits to Personal Data Breach Affecting Half a Million Donors’, ABC News 
(online), 28 October 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-28/red-cross-blood-service-admits-to-
data-breach/7974036>. 
12  Australian Government Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, DonateBlood.com.au data 
breach (Australian Red Cross Blood Service) Investigation Report (7 August 2017) < 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/resources/privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-investigation-
reports/donateblood-com-au-data-breach-australian-red-cross-blood-service.pdf>  
13  Ibid, 2 
14  Will Ockenden and Benjamin Sveen, ‘Aussie Travel Cover has Hundreds of Thousands of Records 
Stolen in Hacking, Policy Holders Not Informed’, ABC News (online), 20 January 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-01-19/aussie-travel-cover-hacked-customers-not-told/6025652>; 
Marc Moncrief, ‘Kmart Online Customers’ Information Hacked in Security Breach’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 1 October 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/retail/kmart-online-customers-
information-hacked-in-security-breach-20150930-gjyoxe.html>; Will Ockenden, ‘David Jones 
Computer System Hacked and Customers’ Private Details Stolen’, ABC News (online), 2 October 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-02/david-jones-computer-system-hacked-customer-details-
stolen/6824170>.  
As can be seen from the above, data breaches are affecting organisations in the public, private 
and not-for-profit sectors in Australia and internationally. As more aspects of society become 
digitised, the problems presented by insecurely-held data and insecure systems also become 
more evident and potentially debilitating. This can be evidenced by the effects of cyberattacks 
such as the ‘WannaCry’ ransomware attack in May 2017, which infected tens of thousands of 
computers worldwide, including some belonging to the UK National Health Service which 
resulted in some of its health services being suspended during the attack.15  The new Australian 
data breach notification requirements can be seen as one measure contributing to a large body 
of cybersecurity legislation and policy in Australia and internationally, as actions which 
attempt to address data security concerns. 
 
 
3. Background to data breach notification laws 
 
One measure to respond to such data breaches is laws implementing disclosure obligations 
incumbent on the organisation which has suffered a breach, to inform individuals whose data 
has been compromised, as has now been adopted in Australia via the ‘Notifiable Data Breaches 
Act’.  
 
There has been a global trend towards enacting such laws in recent years.16 The State of 
California was the first jurisdiction to implement data breach laws in 2003.17 This was followed 
by the enactment of similar laws in other US states, and then in other globally important 
jurisdictions including the European Union.18 More recently, China adopted a new 
                                                          
15  Tracy Marshall, Sheila Millar and Nathan Cardon, ‘WannaCry: Are Your Security Tools Up to Date?’ 
National Law Review, 22 May 2017, <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/wannacry-are-your-
security-tools-to-date>. 
16  See World Law Group, 'Global Guide to Data Breach Notifications' (Report, Second Edition 2016) i.   
17  Cal Civ Code §1729.98 (West 2010). 
18  See, eg, Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector 
[2002] OJ L 201/37 (‘ePrivacy Directive’) – discussed in more detail below. 
Cybersecurity Law in mid-2017, comprising its first comprehensive national information 
privacy and security regulation, which includes data breach notification requirements.19  
 
More detail will be given on the comparative picture for data breach notification legislation in 
the following section. Here, some background to why data breach notification laws have been 
adopted is offered, their theoretical basis and connection with other legal regimes. 
 
 
3.1 Justifications for data breach notification laws 
 
Overall, the theory behind data breach notification laws is that consumers have the right to 
know when their personal information has been compromised, and that these laws will provide 
incentives for organisations to take adequate steps to protect the personal information they 
hold.20 There are various arguments in favour, and against, implementing data breach 
notification laws.  
 
One argument in favour is that of transparency: that making information about breaches 
publicly known is important in itself, but it may also have the effect of altering internal 
organisational practices in the entity which has suffered the breach,21 and may also have flow-
on effects for all organisations’ data security and protection practices.22 Another argument in 
favour of such laws takes an individual-centric view, and rests on the right of individuals to 
know that their data has been compromised since this gives them the opportunity to take 
                                                          
19  Gabriella Kennedy and Xiaoyan Zhang, ‘China Passes Cybersecurity Law’ (2017) 29(3) Intellectual 
Property & Technology Law Journal 20; Graham Greenleaf and Scott Livingston, ‘China’s New 
Cybersecurity Law – Also a Data Privacy Law?’ (2016) 144 Privacy Laws & Business International 
Report 1. A detailed account of the Chinese cybersecurity legislation and its impact is beyond the scope 
of this article, but is an important topic for further research. 
20  Alana Maurushat, ‘Data Breach Notification Law across the World from California to Australia’ (2009) 
Privacy Law and Business International 1 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1412063##>. 
21  Paul Schwartz and Edward Janger, ‘Notification of data security breaches’ (2007) 105(5) Michigan Law 
Review, 913, 955. 
22  Data Breach Laws Make Companies Serious About Security (7 September 2009) Berkley Law, 
University of California <https://www.law.berkeley.edu/article/data-breach-laws-make-companies-
serious-about-security/>. 
mitigation measures to minimise harm to their personal information from the data breach e.g. 
preventing/mitigating identity theft23 – which may have flow-on benefits to the organisation 
holding the information in terms of reducing their costs vis-à-vis the breach. 
 
Arguments against the enactment of data breach notification laws include: the questionable 
effectiveness of such laws in achieving their purpose; the costs to organisations of notification; 
the stifling of innovation by discouraging firms to innovate by using their customers’ personal 
data;24 and the concern that individuals will not actually act on data breach notifications, 
particularly if they become too desensitised to such notifications by receiving too many 
notices.25 
  
It is difficult to judge how accurate justifications for and against data breach notification 
requirements are in practice due to the limited empirical research conducted on their efficacy. 
The limited, extant research has mainly been conducted by a team from Carnegie Mellon 
University: Romanosky, Telang and Acquisti estimated the impact of data breach notification 
laws in the US on identity theft between 2002 and 2009, and found that adopting such laws 
reduced identity theft caused by data breaches by 6.1% on average.26 This is consistent with 
further research in the form of an economic analysis of data breach notification laws conducted 
by Romanosky, Sharp and Acquisti, which found that while such schemes could increase costs 
to organisations, these organisations could also increase their investment in security measures 
which may lower social costs overall, and they also found that the disclosure of breaches could 
induce consumers to increase their own level of care as regards their personal information.27 
 
                                                          
23  Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang and Alessandro Acquisti, 'Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce 
Identity Theft? (Updated)' (2011) 30(2) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 256, 257. 
24   Thomas M Lenard and Paul H Rubin, 'Slow Down on Data Security Legislation' (Progress Snapshot 
No 1.9, Technology Policy Institute, August 2005) 3 <https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wpcontent/ 
uploads/2005/08/slow-down-on-data-security-leg-2007064.pdf>; Thomas M Lenard and Paul H Rubin, 
'Much Ado about Notification' (2006) 29(1) Regulation 44, 46. 
25  Fred H Cate, 'Another notice isn't answer', USA Today (online), 27 February 2005 <http://usatoday30. 
usatoday.com/news/opinion/2005-02-27-consumer-protection-oppose_x.htm>. 
26  Romanosky, Telang, and Acquisti, above n 23, 260. 
27  Sasha Romanosky, Richard Sharp and Alessandro Acquisti, ‘Data Breaches and Identity Theft: When is 
Mandatory Disclosure Optimal?’ (Paper presented at the Ninth Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security, Harvard University, 7 July 2010) 2.  
This empirical research suggests that data breach notification laws may have an overall positive 
effect on encouraging better data security practices and preventing identity fraud. However, 
there is clearly a need for more systematic research to be conducted into the impacts, intended 
and unintended consequences of these laws, and in jurisdictions outside of the US which do 
have comprehensive data protection laws, such as the EU - and now Australia. 
 
 
3.2 The relationship between personal data breach notification and data privacy laws 
 
There are similarities between data breach notification laws concerning breaches of personal 
information and laws protecting data privacy since they usually both involve legislative 
provisions relating to the protection of personal information, seek to foster better security 
practices and provide individuals with information about how their data is stored and used.28  
 
However, there are important conceptual differences between these laws, including their 
original rationales, the market-based nature of data breach laws which are ‘cognizant of 
corporate compliance cost burdens’ and (originally) designed to mitigate identity theft 
especially in the US, compared to the rights-based protections for individual interests 
encompassed by more comprehensive information privacy laws.29 Burdon also notes that both 
kinds of laws also share certain common weaknesses because they focus unduly on the type of 
information regulated rather than the broader social contexts and relationships involved in the 
gathering and exchange of personal information.30 This has entailed that both data breach 
notification laws and data privacy laws in jurisdictions such as the US and EU are based on 
chains of accountability comprising providers, collectors and re-users of personal information, 
a chain which is too simplistic for the complex reality of information gathering and exchange 
in the various contexts in which this occurs.31  
                                                          
28  Mark Burdon, ‘Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of Information Privacy and Data Breach 
Notification Laws’ (2011) 27(1) Santa Clara Computer and High-Technology Law Journal 63, 65. 
29  Ibid 66, 86. Although Lynskey recognises the ‘hybrid’ nature of EU data protection law, as both a 
rights-based regime, and also as laws facilitating the economic trade of personal data within the 
European Single Market. See Orla Lynksey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 8–9. 
30  Burdon, above n 28, 66. 
31  Ibid 98. 
 In practice, as will be detailed in the next section, data breach notification legislation has been 
implemented in jurisdictions which both have existing comprehensive data protection laws 
(such as the EU, and, more recently, Australia) and also in jurisdictions where there are no 
comparable comprehensive laws (such as the US).  
 
 
3.3 The relationship between data breach notification and consumer protection laws 
 
Another connection can be made between data breach notification laws and consumer 
protection law. As will be seen in the following section, the US Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has adopted a strong role in regulating consumer privacy in its jurisdiction, using its 
broad authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive practices within which the FTC has included 
data breaches and notification.32 The flexibility of consumer protection law provisions and lack 
of comprehensive federal data privacy law in the US may be factors contributing to the FTC’s 
activities in this area.  
 
A strong link has not been established in practice between data breach notifications and 
consumer protection law in other jurisdictions, which may be related to the generally 
diminished role consumer protection has played regarding data so far, a possible consequence 
of the presence of data privacy laws in these places. However, conceptually the link between 
data breaches and consumer protection is increasingly being recognised. In the EU, the 
tardiness of consumer law to consider the digital economy matters has been acknowledged,33 
as well as its potential to play a greater role in that jurisdiction as regards data privacy and 
security in the future.34 In Australia, Corones and Davies noted that the general prohibitions in 
the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) regulating misleading conduct, unconscionable conduct 
                                                          
32  15 U.S.C. §§41-58. See: Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, ‘The FTC and the new common law of 
privacy’ (2014) 114 Columbia Law Review 583. 
33  Natali Helberger, Marco Loos, Lucie Guibault, Chantal Mak and Lodewijk Pessers, ‘Digital Content 
Contracts for Consumers’ (2013) 36(1) Journal of Consumer Policy 37. 
34  Angela Daly and Amanda Scardamaglia, ‘Profiling the Australian Google Consumer: Implications of 
Search Engine Practices for Consumer Law and Policy’ (2017) 40(3) Journal of Consumer Policy 299.  
and false or misleading representations35 had not, at the time of writing, formed the basis of 
proceedings against online privacy or data security breaches.36 However, they consider that the 
‘ACL’ could ‘serve as a useful instrument in the regulation and enforcement of online privacy 
and data security breaches’ in appropriate circumstances,37 especially given private 
enforcement actions in the form of litigation are possible under the ACL, in contrast to the 
‘Privacy Act’.38 A very recent update on this topic has occurred in the form of a class action on 
behalf of NSW Ambulance staff whose medical records were sold to solicitors, against NSW 
Ambulance for alleged ‘breach of confidence, invasion of privacy, breach of contract and 
misleading and deceptive conduct’ on the basis of NSW Ambulance inadequately protecting 
their records, in a test case which may also establish whether a tort of breach of privacy exists 
at common law in Australia.39 
 
 
4. Data breach notification laws in the US and EU 
 
Data breach notification laws have widely implemented in the US, where 47 states including 
Washington DC, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have introduced such laws.40 The 
EU also has data breach notification schemes at the EU level, which have then been 
implemented in Member States.41 Jurisdictions in other parts of the world have also adopted 
data breach notification laws: for instance, Indonesia also has data breach notification 
requirements for both public and private sector and not-for-profit ‘electronic systems operators’ 
                                                          
35  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Sch 2. 
36  Stephen Corones and Juliet Davis, ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy and Data Security: Regulatory 
Challenges and Potential Future Directions’ (2017) 45 Federal Law Review 66, 67 
37  Ibid, 69. 
38  ACL ss 232, 236-237. Corones and Davis, above n 36, 91. 
39  Harriet Alexander, ‘Paramedics launch class action over the sale of their medical records to personal 
injury solicitors’ Sydney Morning Herald 18 November 2017 http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/paramedics-
launch-class-action-over-the-sale-of-their-medical-records-to-personal-injury-solicitors-20171118-
gzo44u.html  
40  National Conference of State Legislatures, Security Breach Notification Laws (12 April 2017) 
<http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx>. 
41  For the implementation in eg Italy, see Alessandro Mantelero, ‘Si Rafforza la Tutela Dei Dati Personali: 
Data Breach Notification e Limiti Alla Profilazione Mediante Cookies’ (2012) 28 Il Diritto 
dell’informazione e dell’Informatica 781. 
and to actions ‘through electronic media’.42 As mentioned above, China has also recently 
adopted a new Cybersecurity Law which includes data breach notification provisions. 
 
In order to provide a point of comparison for the new Australian legislation a brief overview 
given of existing data breach notification laws in the US and EU will be provided here. They 
are the two major Western jurisdictions to have adopted data breach legislation, which they 
have possessed for some time, relatively speaking, with the US in particular being an early 
adopter of these provisions. Furthermore, they each represent a different Western model of 
(data) privacy protection identified by Lindsay - the European ‘rights-based’ approach and the 
American ‘market-based’ approach - which Australia can consider for the development of its 
own laws on this topic.43 
 
 
4.1 US 
 
The US does not have comprehensive data breach notification laws at the federal level. Instead, 
there are some sector-specific breach requirements in federal legislation, and most states have 
such laws in their own jurisdictions, whose provisions vary. It is important to note that data 
breach notification laws in the US have mainly been introduced with an objective of dealing 
with cybercrime, by giving individuals affected the opportunity to mitigate any harm they may 
suffer from the breach, and giving organisations incentives to adopt better data security 
practices lest they suffer from reputation damage. This can also be evidenced by the many 
instances of data breach litigation in the US, and the debates concerning whether it is necessary 
to demonstrate harm or injury beyond a ‘mere’ unauthorised accessing of data. 
 
 
                                                          
42  Graham Greenleaf and Sinta Dewi Rosadi, ‘Indonesia’s Data Protection Regulation 2012: A Brief Code 
with Data Breach Notification’ (2013) 122 Privacy Laws and Business International Report 24, 24. 
43  David Lindsay, ‘An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the Implications for the Future 
of Australian Privacy Law’ (2005) 29(1) Melbourne University Law Review 131. However, as mentioned 
above Lynskey notes that European data protection law has a ‘hybrid’ nature as a rights-based and 
economics-driven legal regime. See Lynskey, above n 29.  
4.1.1 Federal level statutes 
 
While the US does not have comprehensive data privacy laws at the federal level, there are 
some sector-specific data privacy laws, which have data breach provisions. The most 
prominent legislation includes:  
 the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act),44 which has been used by the FTC to 
prohibit unfair or deceptive practices as regards consumer privacy and security 
policies;45  
 the Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) regulating the 
collection, use and disclosure of financial information;46 
 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulating medical 
information,47 as revised by the HIPAA ‘Omnibus Rule’ in 2013. 
In addition to these requirements for segments of the private sector, there are also obligations 
incumbent on state and federal government agencies to notify of breaches of data in their 
possession or databases.48  
 
Regarding the enforcement of these provisions, Rabin has observed that there are two main 
forms for regulatory action at the federal level as regards data breaches: federal agencies’ use 
of enforcement actions or rulemaking ‘to influence the data security practices of corporations 
within the federal agency’s mandate’; and the imposition of criminal penalties for data breaches 
and data misuse.49   
 
                                                          
44  15 U.S.C. §§41-58 
45  The FTC also enforces other legislation such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 
(15 U.S.C. §§6501-6506) applying to the online collection of information from children. 
46  15 U.S.C. §§6801-6827 
47  42 U.S.C. §1301 et seq. 
48  World Law Group, above n 16, 59. The federal-level data breach notification regimes were due to be 
supplemented by the ‘FCC Privacy Rule’ for broadband Internet Service Providers adopted by the 
Federal Communications Commission at the end of the Obama administration. The FCC Privacy Rule 
included data security and data breach notification requirements would have come into force during 2017. 
However, in April 2017, President Donald Trump signed into law a bill passed by the US Congress that 
repealed the FCC Privacy Rule before it came into force. See: Paul Gaus, ‘Only the Good Regulations 
Die Young: Recognizing the Consumer Benefits of the FCC’s Now-Defunct Privacy Regulations’ (2017) 
18(2) Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 713. 
49  Robert Rabin, ‘Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security and Tort Law’ (2017) 66(2) DePaul Law Review 
313, 319. 
Some features of the three most prominent federal data breach regimes are outlined below. 
 
 
4.1.1.1 The FTC Act 
 
The FTC has taken a prominent role in addressing data security breaches in the US, especially 
as regards organisations which are not covered under one of the sector-specific federal schemes 
such as HIPAA,50 and has done so on the basis of section 5 of the FTC Act which prohibits 
‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce’.51 The FTC has made deceptive 
practices claims in circumstances when an organisation has a data breach after having 
published statements that it secured data, with unfair practices claims regarding data security 
being made less frequently.52 Since 2002, the FTC has brought more than 60 cases against 
companies whose practices have placed consumers’ data ‘at unreasonable risk’, and in one case 
from 2016 the FTC ordered the company in breach (LabMD) to notify customers whose 
personal information was exposed.53  
 
The FTC’s activities in this area have been criticised from a due process perspective for not 
offering sufficient clarity and publicity as to what data security practices it considers to be 
‘fair’, especially when the agency can levy large fines for organisations in violation.54 
However, there are some exceptions, such as the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule, which 
sets out notification instructions for companies with websites that collect consumer health data 
or applications for personal health records (and are not covered by HIPAA) which have 
experienced a data security breach.55  
 
                                                          
50  Gerard Stegmaier and Wendell Bartnick, ‘Physics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s 
Hidden Data-Security Requirements’ (2013) 20(3) George Mason Law Review 673, 674. 
51  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) 
52  Stegmaier and Bartnick, above n 50, 674-675. 
53  Federal Trade Commission, Privacy and Security Update (2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-
data-security-update-2016#data>. 
54  Stegmaier and Bartnick, above n 50.  
55  Federal Trade Commission, Health Breach Notification Rule (August 2009) <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/health-breach-notification-rule>. 
 4.1.1.2 HIPAA 
 
Other data breach notification requirements are found in federal sector-specific legislation. 
Prominent among them is the data breach notification requirement in the HIPAA Breach 
Notification Rule which requires HIPAA-covered entities to provide a notification following a 
breach of unsecured protected health information.56 A breach is defined as an impermissible 
use or disclosure that compromises the privacy or security of the protected health information.  
 
There is an exception for circumstances where the organisation which has suffered the breach 
can demonstrate that there is a low probability that the information has been compromised 
based on a risk assessment of:  
 the nature and extent of the health information involved, including the types of 
identifiers and likelihood of re-identification;  
 the unauthorised person who used the information or to whom the information was 
disclosed;  
 whether the information was actually acquired or viewed; and  
 whether and to what extent the risk to the information was mitigated.  
 
There are exceptions in cases: where a breach by an employee or contractor was unintentional 
and made in good faith and within the scope of authority; where a breach was an inadvertent 
disclosure by one employee or contractor to another (both of whom being authorised to access 
the information); and where the organisation has a good faith belief that the unauthorised 
person to whom the impermissible disclosure of information was made would not have been 
able to retain the information. 
 
Most notifications must be provided within 60 days of the discovery of a breach, with an 
exception for breaches affecting less than 500 individuals which can be submitted annually to 
the US federal Department of Health and Human Services. Notifications need only be provided 
                                                          
56  45 CFR §§ 164.400-414. 
for information which is ‘unsecured’ i.e. information that has not been rendered unusable, 
unreadable or indecipherable to unauthorised individuals. Guidance is issued by the 
Department Secretary as to what technologies and methods can be used to render information 
secure, which currently includes forms of encryption for electronic data.57 
 
 
4.1.1.3 Financial data breaches 
 
Data breach notification requirements for personal information held by financial organisations 
are contained in the Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to 
Customer Information and Customer Notice, an interpretation of section 501(b) of the Gramm-
Leach Bliley Act.58 This Guidance contains an obligation for an organisation to notify its 
customers and regulator when there is an incident of unauthorised access to ‘sensitive consumer 
information’ (including name, address, telephone number in conjunction with the customer’s 
Social Security number, driver’s licence number, account number, credit card number, or 
account username and password). Customers should be notified when the financial 
organisation discovers unauthorised access to customer information and has concluded that 
misuse of the information has occurred or that this is a reasonable possibility. This notification 
should happen as soon as possible, except in circumstances where an appropriate law 
enforcement agency determines that notification will interfere with a criminal investigation. 
Notably there is no exception for the use of measures such as encryption as in other data breach 
notification laws.  
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and Data Breach Notification for Financial Institutions’ (2006) 10(1) North Carolina Banking Institute 
269. 
4.1.2 State level statutes 
 
The State of California was the first American state (and the international leader) to implement 
a data breach notification law.59 This law entails that anyone who conducts business in 
California involving computerised personal data must notify Californian residents of an 
existing or potential breach that includes the unauthorised acquisition of unencrypted digital 
personal information, without reasonable delay. The notification can be made via 
communication directly to individuals, through a notice posted on the organisation’s website, 
or via state media sources if the data breach involved more than 500,000 individuals or would 
exceed US$250,000. There are various exemptions to the notification requirement, including 
if the breach related to a good faith acquisition of personal information by an employee or agent 
of the organisation in breach, or if the personal information at issue is encrypted. The law also 
limits the definition of personal information to an individual’s name in combination with other 
identifying information such as a social security number, drivers licence, bank account details, 
etc – which can be explained by the fact that the law was introduced as a measure to address 
identity fraud.60 
 
Since this law was introduced in California, almost every other US State (and the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico and Guam) has implemented data breach notification laws of their own, 
with at least 23 of these laws based on the Californian one.61 Some of these laws diverge from 
the Californian model by requiring a threshold of harm (e.g. reasonable likelihood of harm or 
material harm) to be suffered arising from the breach before a notification is mandated by law.62 
Some states also require an organisation suffering from a breach to conduct an investigation 
soon after a breach to determine whether there is the need to notify individuals or law 
enforcement agencies.63 Other variances with the Californian model include: the need to notify 
certain law enforcement or consumer credit agencies of the breach; broader definitions of what 
                                                          
59  California Civil Code §1798.82. 
60  Mark Burdon, Bill Lane and Paul von Nessen, ‘The mandatory notification of data breaches: Issues 
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61  Paul M Schwartz and Edward J Janger, ‘Notification of Data Security Breaches’ (2007) 105(5) Michigan 
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constitutes personal information; the inclusion of personal information held in non-electronic 
formats; and the imposition of fines or civil penalties for non-compliance.64 
 
 
4.1.3 Data breach litigation 
 
In addition to enforcement action regarding data breaches taken by the FTC and other 
regulatory bodies, the US has also experienced a comparatively significant amount of litigation 
concerning data breaches, including class actions, notwithstanding challenges plaintiffs have 
faced in proving standing and injury in accordance with Article III of the US Constitution.65  
 
Based on a review of case-law, Cease notes that such class actions ‘are often state law claims 
for negligence and breach of implied contract’,66 and often involve three types or categories of 
alleged injury: when a third party has stolen an individual’s personal or financial information 
and the third party has used that information to make purchases using the individual’s money 
(a class of cases which tend to satisfy standing issues concerning the need for plaintiffs to suffer 
an injury in fact); when individuals’ information has been accessed and used in other ways 
producing harm such as incurring costs for credit-monitoring services, paying to cancel and 
receive new bank cards and suffering stress and anxiety (it is less clear whether plaintiffs in 
these cases have met the standing requirement); and when a plaintiff brings a case on the belief 
that their information is not being sufficiently protected and it could potentially be accessed by 
a third party in the future (this category is the least likely to meet the standing requirement).67 
 
Some further empirical analysis has been conducted by Romanosky, Hoffman, and Acquisti 
regarding data breach notification litigation in the US between 2005 and 2010. The main 
notable findings were: that data breaches were more likely to be litigated when individuals had 
suffered financial loss; that they were also more likely to be litigated when the breach was 
                                                          
64  Burdon, Lane, and von Nessen, above n 60, 117. 
65  The seminal case on standing in the US is Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife (504 U.S. 555 (1992)) in 
which the Supreme Court recognised standing for injuries that were either actual or imminent. 
66  Caroline Cease, ‘Giving out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data Breach Litigation’ 
(2014) 66 Alabama Law Review 395, 397. 
67  Ibid at 397-404. 
unauthorised disclosure or disposal of consumer information rather than breaches caused by 
lost or stolen data or cyberattacks; and when the information concerned was financial 
information.68 They also found that breaches involving medical data, and those caused by 
cyberattacks were more likely to result in the case being settled.69 However, overall only 4% 
of breaches resulted in federal litigation, and the authors warned that litigation could only be 
effective ‘to the extent that a plaintiff can identify the cause of a breach and subsequent harm’, 
with scenarios involving data brokers being more conceptually problematic because of the lack 
of direct relationship between these actors and the individuals whose data they handle.70 The 
constituent requirements of standing, including injury, proximity and causation, can be seen 
here to mount obstacles for plaintiffs in US data breach litigation. 
 
On the issue of standing in data breach litigation, the Seventh Circuit court issued its opinion 
in Remijas v Neiman Marcus,71 a 2015 case ‘widely recognized as having opened the door to 
standing in the subset of information privacy cases that involve data breaches’.72 The Seventh 
Circuit court recognised standing in certain situations where there was a risk with an 
‘objectively reasonably likelihood’ to occur.73 Given the circumstances at hand, ‘plaintiffs in 
data breach litigation have standing when hackers or thieves access financial of potentially 
injurious information, and some members of this exposed group suffer fraudulent charges’.74 
However, in proceedings subsequent to the Remijas decision, many courts have distinguished 
the decision on legal and factual bases, especially where there is no injury among any members 
of the class, with only a few courts following it, where the circumstances were very similar to 
those in Remijas.75 There has been a subsequent Supreme Court ruling in the 2016 Spokeo v 
Robins judgement concerning standing issues,76 although from the perspective of data breach 
litigation, Rotenberg and Thomson have argued that the decision does not provide much clarity 
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76  Spokeo, Inc v Robins, 136 Supreme Court 1540 (2016). 
to the standing issue.77 Thus standing is likely to pose an ongoing obstacles to some claims in 
the context of data breach litigation. 
 
A more general critique of this kind of litigation has been advanced by Cohen, who has 
criticised the jurisprudential isolation of data breaches from cases of more general data 
profiling, despite profiling’s negative effects for personal data protection and security: by 
emphasising the purported exceptional nature of data breaches, she has argued that ‘courts … 
ignore the extent to which background norms and design practices favoring virtually 
unconstrained data collection, processing and exchange harm the subjects of those practices’, 
harm which may not be imminent or immediate, and has not properly been addressed by 
American courts to date.78 
 
 
4.1.4 Summary of US situation 
 
As can be seen from the above, the overall situation in the US is a patchwork of unharmonised 
data breach notification legislation: unharmonised both across different states and federal 
jurisdictions, and also unharmonised across different industry sectors at the federal level. This 
leads to a situation where a company which has experienced a breach must look to the different 
state-level laws of where the individuals whose data has been breached reside in order to 
determine whether and how the individual should be notified of the breach, and may also have 
to look to the federal sector-specific laws too – all of which impose differing standards. Peters 
has argued that this situation of legislative disharmony ‘compounds the problems and costs 
associated with these breaches’.79 
 
To improve this situation, some commentators have called for a general data breach notification 
requirements at the federal level in order to remedy the lack of consistencies and ensure 
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residents of any state will be notified about data breaches involving their personal 
information.80 Bills have been put before Congress, but at the time of writing none has passed 
into law. 
 
While data breach litigation, especially class actions, has been used as a tool by individuals 
affected by data breaches to address the negative consequences of such events, the aftermath 
of the Seventh Circuit court decision in Remijas may still pose obstacles for plaintiffs who 
cannot show harms such as identity fraud themselves or among some members of their class. 
A data breach which compromises their privacy and information security per se probably 
cannot occasion a successful claim alone. 
 
Overall, given this picture, Rabin has argued that the current US approach to data breaches has 
three outstanding main problems: ‘(1) uncompensated victims; (2) inadequate incentives for 
companies and governments to invest in data security; and (3) uncertainty for corporations with 
respect to their regulatory burdens and litigation risk’.81 He asserts that the failures of the 
existing US data breach regime to prevent data breaches occurring in practice can be attributed 
to the absence of a comprehensive federal regime on the topic, the lack of clear rules and 
standards issued through administrative agencies’ individual enforcement actions, and the 
limited mandates these administrative agencies actually have to address data breaches.82 
 
 
4.2 European Union 
 
                                                          
80  See: Jonathan Darrow and Stephen D Lichtenstein, ‘Do You Really Need My Social Security Number? 
Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age’ (2008) 10(1) North Carolina Journal of Law and 
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In contrast to the US, the EU has comprehensive data protection laws, firstly in the form of the 
1995 Data Protection Directive (‘DRD’),83 which is currently being superseded by the General 
Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’).84 This differs from the US approach to data privacy, 
which has generally been sector-based as mentioned above, and provides an overall weaker 
level of substantive protection than in the EU.85 In this sense, Australia resembles the EU more 
closely, with the ‘Privacy Act’ as its own comprehensive federal-level data privacy regime. 
 
However, data breach notification requirements are not just found in the EU’s main data 
privacy legislation: instead there are various requirements contained in different EU laws. 
Indeed, the initial notification obligation can be found in the ePrivacy Directive, which despite 
its name is not the EU’s main data protection law (which is the aforementioned DRD, to be 
superseded by the GDPR). This obligation has been supplemented by others in the GDPR and 
also in the EU’s first cybersecurity Directive. In July 2014, the EU also adopted its Regulation 
on electronic identification and trust services (eIDAS Regulation) which introduced breach 
notification for ‘trust service providers’, a category which could encompass telecoms providers 
and financial institutions.86  
 
Similarly to the aforementioned criticisms of the US situation, Esayas has argued that this 
‘array of breach notification requirements within the EU means that an organization might be 
required to notify for different aspects of the same breach under different notification 
requirement, creating significant administrative and financial burden for multinational 
companies’.87 However, with the transition of legal instrument from Directives to Regulations 
containing most of the EU’s data breach notification obligations, there should be a higher 
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degree of harmonised implementation of these obligations in Member States,88 and so a less 
fragmented approach to notification obligations should be achieved in the Single Market, at 
least compared to the US. Yet the EU’s new cybersecurity legislation is in the form of a 
Directive, not a Regulation, and there are still differing standards in the different sectoral laws, 
as will be seen below. 
 
 
4.2.1. ePrivacy Directive  
 
Until the GDPR, the ePrivacy Directive has, since its 2009 revision, included the main data 
breach notification obligation in the EU, directed at the ‘electronic communications sector’ 
rather than more generally at all organisations.89 Organisations falling within the scope of these 
obligations are telecommunications companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs), a narrow 
focus that has been contentious.90 
 
A ‘personal data breach’ is defined in Article 2 of the Directive, as ‘a breach of security leading 
to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access 
to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provision of 
a publicly available electronic communications services in the Community’. The data breach 
notification obligations itself is contained in Art 4(2), and provides that providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services must inform subscribers of a particular risk of a 
breach to the network’s security. When the risk lies outside ‘the scope of the measures to be 
taken by the service provider’, the provider must inform subscribers of ‘any possible remedies, 
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including an indication of the likely costs involved’. Providers are also under an obligation in 
Art 4(3) to notify the competent national authority of any personal data breach. They must also 
inform any individual (who does not necessarily have to be a ‘subscriber’) if their privacy or 
personal data is likely to be adversely affected by the personal data breach, without undue 
delay.  
 
There are exemptions from this notification requirement if the provider demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the competent authority that it implemented appropriate technological protection 
measures (such as encryption) and applied these to the data affected by the security breach that 
would ‘render the data unintelligible to any person who is not authorised to access it’. In 2014, 
the Article 29 Working Party provided non-binding guidance to data controllers to assist them 
in determining whether to notify individuals affected of a personal data breach, with illustrative 
(but non-exhaustive) examples of situations in which notifications to individuals would be 
appropriate.91 
 
Subsequent to the ePrivacy Directive’s 2009 reform, the EU adopted Regulation 611/2013 with 
the objective of harmonising the ePrivacy Directive’s data breach notification requirements 
among Member States. The Regulation concerns the notification of personal data breaches by 
providers of publicly available electronic communications services. There is an obligation to 
notify the competent national authority within 24 hours of any (regardless of severity) personal 
data breach being detected.92 Individuals whose personal data or privacy is likely to be 
adversely affected in a personal data breach should also be notified,93 although this is not 
required if the provider implemented appropriate technological protection measures to the data 
concerned which render the data unintelligible to unauthorised persons accessing it, as 
described above.94 
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The ePrivacy regime is currently under review in the EU, with a proposal for a new ePrivacy 
Regulation being discussed at the time of writing.95 There is no explicit data breach notification 
requirement in the proposals, perhaps due to the implementation of data breach notification 
requirements in the GDPR and NIS Directive, detailed below. However, Article 17 of the 
proposed ePrivacy Regulation includes an obligation for electronic communications service 
providers to inform end-users of any risks that may compromise the network and service 
security, as well as inform them of any possible remedies that they should implement if the risk 
‘lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by the service provider’.96  
 
 
4.2.2 GDPR 
 
In 2016, the EU adopted its update to data protection laws, the GDPR, whose provisions are 
scheduled to come into force in May 2018. The GDPR strengthens existing EU data protection 
standards, and introduces certain new elements, including an increased extra-territorial scope,97 
a right to data portability,98 and the principle of data protection by design and by default.99  
 
The GDPR also includes data breach notification obligations. The GDPR’s data breach 
notification obligations cover a broader range of situations than those covered by the ePrivacy 
Directive, given that they are incumbent on data controllers in any sector, while the ePrivacy 
Directive is confined to the telecommunications sector. Also, the level of fines under the GDPR 
for non-compliance with its provisions are high: up to 2% of global turnover.100 
  
The GDPR defines a ‘personal data breach’ in almost identical language to the revised ePrivacy 
Directive, with the exception that the relevant breach is defined more generically, rather than 
just those related to the electronic communications sector. It also contains two sets of 
obligations. One is for data controllers to notify a personal data breach to the competent 
supervisory authority within 72 hours, unless the breach is ‘unlikely to result in a risk to the 
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rights and freedoms of natural persons’.101 The other data breach notification obligation 
concerns the communication of a personal data breach by the data controller to the data subject, 
which must happen ‘without undue delay’ when the breach ‘is likely to result in a high risk to 
the rights and freedoms of natural persons’.102 However, data controllers are exempt from this 
obligation in certain circumstances: when the controller has implemented and applied technical 
and organisational measures to the affected personal data in ways which render it unintelligible 
to unauthorised persons (such as encryption); the controller has taken mitigation measures 
which ensure that the high risk to data subjects’ rights and freedoms is no longer likely to 
materialise; and when it would involve ‘disproportionate effort’, in which case a public 
communication or similar measure would suffice.103 
 
 
4.2.3 NIS Directive 
 
In addition to the GDPR, breach notification obligations are also included in the new Directive 
on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive), the first EU-level legislation 
on cybersecurity, which entered into force in August 2016. Concerns have been raised about 
the risk of unnecessary costs due to a lack of harmonisation across Member States in 
implementing the NIS Directive incident reporting, and the overlapping scope of the data 
breach notification requirements between the NIS Directive and the GDPR.104 
 
The NIS Directive places on operators of ‘essential services’105 and ‘digital service 
providers’’106 notification requirements. Operators of essential services must notify, without 
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undue delay, the competent authority or computer security incident response teams 
(CSIRTs)107 of incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of the essential services 
they provide.108 Various factors are given in order to determine the significance of an incident’s 
impact: the number of users affected, the incident’s duration; and the geographical area affected 
by the incident.109 The competent authority or CSIRT may inform the general public about 
security incidents in circumstances ‘where public awareness is necessary in order to prevent an 
incident or to deal with an ongoing incident’.110  
 
In order to implement and enforce these obligations, Member States’ competent authorities 
should have the powers to require essential services operators to provide the necessary 
information to assess their network and information systems’ security, and evidence of the 
effective implementation of security policies.111 The competent authority also has an obligation 
to work closely with data protection authorities when addressing incidents resulting in personal 
data breaches.112 
 
There is also a separate incident notification obligation for digital service providers, which is 
very similar in substance to the obligation on essential service providers.113 In addition, there 
is an obligation to notify if an essential service relies on a third-party digital service provider, 
and if there is a ‘significant impact on the continuity of the essential services due to an incident 
affecting the digital service provider’.114 Furthermore, there is provision for the general public 
to be notified, but in slightly different circumstances to the essential service providers’ 
obligation above: where public awareness is necessary in order to prevent an incident, deal 
with an ongoing incident or where disclosure is otherwise in the public interest.115 
 
In addition to these mandatory requirements on essential services providers and digital service 
providers, other operators may notify on a voluntary basis of any incident having a significant 
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impact on the continuity of their services, and this voluntary notification will not result in any 
new obligations being placed on the operator.116 
 
 
4.2.4 Summary of EU situation 
 
The above discussion shows some parallels between the US and EU data breach notification 
requirement frameworks, such as fragmentation through a lack of harmonisation of different 
data breach notification requirements in different legislation aimed at different sectors. The 
GDPR’s data breach notification obligations incumbent on data controllers in any sector should 
result in some level of harmonisation across different industry sectors, although the endurance 
of pre-existing obligations in the ePrivacy Directive (for the time being), and the introduction 
of new ones in the NIS Directive, will still have the effect of exposing operators in certain 
industries to additional breach notification requirements. 
 
The use of Regulations as a legal instrument to introduce new data breach notification 
obligations in the eIDAS Regulation and then the GDPR may mitigate a lack of harmonised 
approach to the implementation of EU laws in this area at the Member State level, however 
this lack of harmonisation may still ensue from the NIS Directive’s implementation.  
 
It may be merely rhetorical, but the wording of the GDPR’s data breach notification obligations 
does point to the (partial) ‘rights-based’ nature of European data privacy law, with mention 
made of ‘the rights and freedoms of natural persons’ in the context of data breaches. While this 
may be laudable, there is little empirical evidence as regards the extent to which the EU’s data 
breach notification requirements actually are effective in upholding the fundamental rights, or, 
for that matter, economic interests, of European citizens. Such empirical evidence on this point 
should be a topic of further research in order to assess the efficacy of notification requirement 
in the EU and to guide future legislative and policy reform in this area.  
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A further point of divergence between the EU and US has been on the issue of data breach 
litigation. Litigation, especially in the form of class actions, has played a much more marginal 
role in addressing data breaches in the EU than the US. Indeed, in some jurisdictions such as 
the UK, it is only at the time of writing that the first class action proceedings regarding a data 
breach have been initiated as a test case.117 It remains to be seen whether there will be any 
growth in litigation in the coming years, particularly with the implementation of the GDPR 
obligations concerning data breaches and data breach notification.  
  
 
5. Existing Australian situation 
 
Before turning to examine the new data breach notification legislation in Australia, the legal 
scenario preceding the introduction of these measures is outlined here. The aforementioned 
‘Privacy Act’ is the main piece of legislation governing data privacy and security in Australia, 
and there are also specific state and territory-level laws governing aspects of this topic. A brief 
description of these laws is given.  
 
 
5.1 Commonwealth legislation 
 
The ‘Privacy Act’ regulates the handling of personal information about individuals (natural 
persons) that includes the collection, use, storage and disclosure of this information, as well as 
access to and correction of personal information. Organisations bound by the ‘Privacy Act’ are 
Commonwealth agencies (with exemptions), private companies with an annual turnover of 
more than $3 million and private health service providers (regardless of size).118  
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The ‘Privacy Act’ contains the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs), which comprise 
obligations as regards personal information that bind Commonwealth agencies and large 
private companies. The most relevant APP to the topic of unauthorised access to and disclosure 
of information that may otherwise constitute a data breach is APP 6 on the use or disclosure of 
personal information, which states that if an APP entity holds personal information about an 
individual, it must not be used or disclosed for a purpose other than for the primary purpose 
for which it was collected, unless the individual has consented, or unless the individual would 
reasonably expect the APP entity to use or disclose the information for that secondary 
purpose.119 In addition to these requirements, the ‘Privacy Act’ also contains provisions relating 
to the proper use or disclosure of credit reporting information,120 including the use and 
disclosure of information by mortgage insurers, credit managers, advisers and related bodies 
corporate.121 
 
As regards information security, APP 11 is of utmost importance: it provides that organisations 
must take ‘such steps that are reasonable in the circumstances’ to protect personal information 
it holds from ‘misuse, interference and loss’ and from ‘unauthorised access, modification or 
disclosure’. Broadly speaking, APP 11 provides that organisations bound by the APPs must 
take reasonable steps to prevent data breaches, whether inadvertent, deliberate or from external 
malicious sources. APP 11 also provides that organisations should destroy personal 
information they hold which is no longer necessary to keep or ensure this information is de-
identified. However, until the new mandatory data breach notification legislation, there was no 
obligation incumbent on organisations bound by the APPs to inform individuals if their 
information was misused, lost or subject to unauthorised access. 
 
If an APP has been breached in the form of an interference with an individual’s privacy, then 
the individual must first make complaints to the organisation allegedly in breach of the APPs, 
and if the organisation does not address the complaint satisfactorily, the individual can escalate 
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the complaint to the federal Privacy Commissioner.122 The federal Privacy Commissioner can 
then investigate the complaint depending on its merits and is also empowered to instigate own-
initiative investigations without there being a complaint.123 Organisations found to have 
engaged in conduct constituting an interference with an individual’s privacy can be subject to 
fines and other measures.124 
 
There are a number of recent determinations by the federal Privacy Commissioner regarding 
entities’ inadequate data security practices in breach of the APPs (and their predecessors: the 
Information Privacy Principles which applied to federal agencies, and the National Privacy 
Principles which applied to private companies).125 One such determination occurred following 
a data breach by private company TeleChoice, where an individual whose personal information 
was compromised was awarded AUS$3,500 for non-economic loss in the form of the 
individual and her family suffering stress and anxiety caused by the interference with her 
privacy, with the implication that the complainant would have received a greater sum had she 
suffered more serious kinds of harm.126 The federal Privacy Commissioner has also undertaken 
a number of Commissioner-initiated investigations in recent years concerning prominent data 
breaches.127 Despite the investigations often concluding that there had been infringements of 
the Privacy Act, usually the Commissioner has not levied a fine on the parties at fault - as can 
be seen in the aforementioned instances involving the Department of Immigration and Border 
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Protection,128 the joint investigation of the Ashley Madison breach,129 and the Australian Red 
Cross Blood Service breach.130 
 
Yet over the last few years there have been serious concerns about the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC), which includes the federal Privacy Commissioner, 
receiving insufficient funding and resourcing from the government to carry out its functions 
effectively.131 Since individuals cannot bring a case to the courts themselves, they must rely on 
an organisation which may be unable, due to resource constraints, to pursue their complaint. 
While Australian consumer protection law may have a greater role to play in the legal sphere 
of data privacy and security, and may bring with it the possibility of private actions and the 
regulatory power of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) as 
mentioned above, no public or private enforcement activity from the perspective of consumer 
protection law on this topic is known to have yet occurred in Australia, with the exception of 
the NSW Ambulance staff class action currently pending.132  
 
 
5.2 State and territory information privacy laws 
 
In addition to Commonwealth legislation, most, but not all, states and territories in Australia 
have information privacy laws regulating state-level public authorities’ use of personal 
information, which contain offences for the unauthorised use and/or disclosure of personal 
information.133 While some states and territories do not have data privacy legislation that 
applies to personal information generally, all have data protection laws specific to the proper 
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management of the personal health information of individuals which contain similar offences 
for the unauthorised disclosure and/or use of personal information.134  
 
 
5.3 Pre-existing data breach notification requirements 
 
In the field of health, prior to the introduction of data breach notification legislation, there is 
one example of a statutory sector-specific data breach notification requirement. The My Health 
Records Act 2012 (Cth) governs the Australian government’s digital health records system. 
Under the My Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 75, an entity that is a registered healthcare 
provider organisation, a registered repository operator, a registered portal operator, or a 
registered contract service provider, is required to notify the state or territory System Operator 
or the Information Commissioner if they become aware of unauthorised collection, use or 
disclosure of health information,135 or if an event or set of circumstances has occurred (or may 
occur) that compromises (or may compromise) the security or integrity of the My Health 
Records system.136 Failure to comply with this notification requirement is a civil penalty 
provision.137  
 
Additionally, as soon as practicable after becoming aware that a situation may occur, the entity 
is obliged to take steps to contain the potential breach, evaluate the risks, and if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the breach and its effects might be serious for at least one healthcare 
recipient, to ask the System Operator to notify all healthcare recipients affected (or if they are 
a System Operator, to carry out that notification).138 If an entity becomes aware that a breach 
has already occurred, they are also obliged to take reasonable steps to contain the breach, 
evaluate the risks, and if they are a System Operator, to notify all healthcare recipients, or to 
ask the System Operator to do so.139 If a significant number of healthcare recipients are 
affected, the general public must also be notified.140 Failure to comply with these sections will 
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not accrue civil penalties, however the legislation notes that failure to comply may have other 
consequences, for example, cancellation of registration.141 
 
Australian government agencies also have an obligation to report cyber security incidents to 
the Australian Signals Directorate, which include various data breach scenarios: any 
compromise or corruption of information; unauthorised access or intrusion into an ICT system; 
data spills; theft or loss of electronic devices that have processed or stored Australian 
government information).142  
 
  
6. Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth) 
  
Until recently Australia had no generic legislation governing the notification of data breaches. 
However, that situation has been remedied by the passage of the Privacy Amendment 
(Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth) which amends the ‘Privacy Act’ by establishing a 
scheme for notification of data breaches. The scheme will commence 12 months after Royal 
Assent, namely 22 February 2018, giving affected entities one year to prepare. 
 
 
6.1 Background to new legislation  
 
The possibility of data breach notification requirements in Australian law is not a novel idea. 
Cautious support in Australia for such measures has been expressed in the past from 
commentators,143 with more mixed views from stakeholder groups.144 The implementation of 
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notification requirements is happening ten years after their first prominent appearance in 
Australian legal debate. 
 
Indeed, the first major recommendations for the introduction of data breach notification 
requirements can be found in the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC) 2008 report 
For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, a recommendation which 
received ‘strong support’ from stakeholders.145 The ALRC proposed a notification requirement 
to the federal Privacy Commissioner and affected individuals in circumstances in which 
‘specified personal information has been, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by 
an unauthorised person, and the agency, organisation or Privacy Commissioner believes that 
the unauthorised acquisition may give rise to a real risk of serious harm to any affected 
individual’. The agency or organisation would have been able to investigate the data breach 
and make an assessment as to whether it would give rise to serious harm to an individual, which 
would not have been confined to identify theft or fraud but also could have included 
discrimination.146  
 
This scheme would have entrusted the agency or organisation with the task of deciding whether 
the triggering event had occurred, while providing oversight by the federal Privacy 
Commissioner, with a preference for consultation between the Privacy Commissioner and the 
agency or organisation in the decision-to-notify process, comprising a co-regulatory model.147 
The ALRC also recommended various exceptions to notification in circumstances: where 
adequate encryption had been used; where good-faith acquisition had occurred by an employee 
or agent acting within the Privacy Act if the information was not subjected to further 
unauthorised disclosure; and would also have given the Privacy Commissioner a broad 
discretion to waive the notification requirement where it was not in the public interest to 
notify.148 The ALRC recommended a minimum content requirement for breach notices which 
would include: a description of the breach; a list of the types of personal information disclosed; 
and contact information for affected individuals to obtain more information and assistance.149 
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Finally, the ALRC recommended that a failure to notify the Privacy Commissioner of such a 
qualifying data breach be subjected to a civil penalty, in appropriate circumstances, such as 
where ‘there was an apparent blatant disregard of the law; the agency or organisation has a 
history of previous contraventions of the law; or there was a significant public detriment arising 
from the breach’.150 
 
However, the ALRC’s Recommendations were not adopted. An attempt to introduce data 
breach notification legislation by a previous Labor government in 2013 failed.151 Despite the 
measures having bipartisan support, the legislation was not passed before the 2013 federal 
election and so lapsed.152 
 
Prior to the new data breach notification legislation, the OAIC issued non-binding guidance for 
organisations on how to handle personal data breaches, which included recommendations to 
inform individuals affected and the OAIC where there was a risk of serious harm.153 Before the 
introduction of the legislative obligations, the OAIC has operated a voluntary breach 
notification scheme whereby organisations having suffered a breach could notify the OAIC of 
that fact. 
 
The current legislation was introduced subsequent to the passage of controversial data retention 
laws in 2015,154 as a part of a political compromise between the Government and the 
Opposition,155 on the basis of a recommendation from the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security.156 The Attorney-General’s Department released an exposure draft of 
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the Bill for comment in December 2015,157 a modified version of the Bill was introduced into 
the Senate in October 2016,158 and passed in February 2017.159 
 
 
6.2 Content of legislation 
 
The Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth) amends the Privacy Act, 
and the new breach notification scheme commences on 22 February 2018, as mentioned above.  
 
The legislation introduces a new notification obligation that the federal Privacy Commissioner 
and any affected individuals be notified when an ‘eligible data breach’ has occurred. An entity 
must give a notification either if it has reasonable grounds to believe an eligible data breach 
has occurred or if it has been directed to give a notification by the Commissioner.160 If an entity 
believes there are reasonable grounds to suspect that it may have suffered an eligible data 
breach, it must carry out a ‘reasonable and expeditious assessment’ within 30 days of when it 
first became aware of whether the circumstances actually amount to an eligible data breach.161 
 
An ‘eligible data breach’ will happen if there is unauthorised access to, or unauthorised 
disclosure of information, and a reasonable person would conclude that the access or disclosure 
would be likely to result in ‘serious harm’ to any of the individuals to whom the information 
relates.162 An eligible data breach will also occur when information is lost in circumstances 
where unauthorised access to, or unauthorised disclosure of information is likely to occur, and 
assuming that the access or disclosure were to occur, a reasonable person would conclude that 
the access or disclosure would be likely to result in ‘serious harm’ to any of the individuals to 
whom the information relates.163 Whether a disclosure might be likely to result in ‘serious 
harm’ is to be determined by reference to: the kind of information affected; the sensitivity of 
information; whether the information is protected by security measures (and whether they 
could be overcome); the kinds of persons who might have obtained the information; the 
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possibility that those persons could circumvent a security technology or methodology used to 
protect the information (e.g. use an encryption key); and the nature of the harm.164 
 
The obligation is binding on APP entities (federal government agencies and businesses with an 
annual turnover greater than AUS$3 million),165 as well as credit reporting bodies, credit 
providers, and tax file number recipients.166 ISPs are also subject to the notification obligations 
even if they would not otherwise be APP entities. If one of these entities become aware that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe a eligible data breach has occurred, ‘as soon as 
practicable’ it must inform the federal Privacy Commissioner of the breach and take reasonable 
steps to notify each individual whose information has been affected by the breach.167 If 
informing individuals individually is not practicable, the organisation can publish a statement 
on its website and take reasonable steps to publicise the statement.168 The statement of 
notification should include the identity and contact details of the entity, a description of the 
suspected eligible data breach, the kinds of information concerned, and recommendations for 
affected individuals.169 
 
However, these entities may not be obligated to inform about data breaches if they take action 
in relation to the unauthorised access or disclosure, or loss of information, before this results 
in serious harm to any of the individuals to whom the information relates, and if a reasonable 
person would conclude that the access, disclosure or loss would not be likely to result in serious 
harm to any of those individuals. Such circumstances are not considered to be an eligible data 
breach, and the entity is not required to notify the individual of the circumstances.170 The 
Privacy Commissioner can also give an entity an exemption from its obligations to inform the 
individuals whose information is at risk if the Commissioner considers it in the public interest 
to do so (but it seems that the Commissioner is not obliged to make this exemption publicly 
known).171 
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The relevant information is information protected by the Privacy Act and ‘all retained 
telecommunications data’ which ISPs are obligated to retain under the aforementioned data 
retention requirements. ‘Harm’ for the purposes of this section means physical, psychological, 
emotional, reputational, economic and financial harm, and whether that harm is ‘serious’ is to 
be considered against various factors, including the subject matter of the information at issue, 
its sensitivity, intelligibility, protective measures, likely recipients, nature of likely harm and 
mitigation of damage undertaken.172 
 
The Privacy Commissioner will have powers to investigate, make determinations, and provide 
remedies in relation to non-compliance.173 The Privacy Commissioner has a new power to 
require an entity, which it has reasonable grounds to believe has suffered a data breach, to make 
a notification.174 The Privacy Commissioner also has the power to declare that an entity does 
not have to comply with the notification obligation, and can extend the time that an entity has 
to comply with the notification obligations.175 
 
The failure to report an eligible data breach will be viewed as an act that is an ‘interference 
with the privacy of an individual’176 for the purposes of the Privacy Act, and such a failure 
could be the subject of a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner.177 Remedies include 
compensation orders, enforceable undertakings, civil penalty orders (of up to $360,000 for 
individuals and up to $1.8 million for corporations), or other any orders the Court considers 
appropriate to compensate an individual for loss or damage, or to prevent or reduce the loss or 
damage that is being or is likely to be suffered by the individual to whom the information 
relates.178 
 
 
7. Analysis 
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7.1 Domestic perspectives 
 
The notification obligations can be welcomed as an attempt to bring Australian data security 
practices as regards data breach notification in line with the emerging practice internationally, 
and as a contribution to the task of improving cybersecurity of Australian public and private 
sector organisations as threats to this cybersecurity appear to be increasing. 
 
The data breach notification obligations broadly replicate the ALRC’s suggestions in 2008, 
such as the trigger of ‘serious harm’, the circumstances in which notification may not be 
necessary (e.g. the use of security measures), the ability for the Privacy Commissioner to waive 
the notification requirement if not in the public interest, and the kinds of information that a 
notification ought to contain.  
 
While the introduction of data breach notification seems to have been generally met with 
cautious approval, there has also been some domestic criticism. Greenleaf identified two major 
deficiencies: the ‘unjustifiable’ exemption of organisations from data breach notification 
requirements which also enjoy Privacy Act exemptions such as small businesses, employers, 
media organisations and political parties (although law enforcement and security agencies 
would probably require ‘special consideration’); and the lack of requirement for the Privacy 
Commissioner to publish the notices it receives from organisations about data breaches on its 
website and retain them there, in one location, for future reference and research purposes.179 
Greenleaf also considers that the Privacy Commissioner should publish information about the 
fact of (possibly anonymised) applications for exemptions from data breach notification 
requirements and the results of these applications in order to ensure procedural transparency.180 
 
Furthermore, the introduction of data breach notification obligations at the federal level in 
Australia has not yet been accompanied by similar notification obligations at the state level. 
While state level data privacy legislation is broadly similar to the federal Privacy Act, they are 
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not completely consistent as it stands,181 and can now be viewed as diverging even more in 
their requirements as regards data breach notification.  
 
Moreover, as regards data security, data breach notification requirements are insufficient alone 
to protect against data security breaches and the problems they cause.182 They are an ex post 
response to a breach, and while they may indirectly have a preventative effect, this is not 
guaranteed. A requirement for more stringent ex ante data security measures would address 
this problem directly, and may be more likely to prevent data breaches from occurring in the 
first place. 
 
At the time of writing, the Australian Government has been considering additional measures 
as regards data security, in the form of the criminalisation of the re-identification of de-
identified information released by federal government agencies.183 While data re-identification 
poses privacy risks, commentators including advocacy group the Australian Privacy 
Foundation has been concerned that this legislative proposal may inhibit legitimate data 
security research and does not provide incentives for Australian Government agencies to 
increase their levels of internal data security.184 
 
Strengthened data privacy and security laws in Australia are a necessary complement to this 
data breach notification legislation. Better enforcement mechanisms, including the right for 
individuals to bring actions themselves, including in the form of class actions, possibly via a 
tort of invasion of privacy, may be one mechanism by which this could be achieved. Despite 
such a cause of action being recommended by law reform bodies,185 the government does not 
at this time support the introduction of such a tort,186 so unless a more ‘suitable’ case with more 
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‘suitable’ factual scenario than Lenah Game Meats reaches the High Court,187 a tort of invasion 
of privacy remain a more academic than pragmatic solution. However, the use of the 
‘Australian Consumer Law’, with its possibilities for private actions, to address data privacy 
and security breaches may be a (partial) solution to this issue.188 Furthermore, the 
aforementioned pending NSW Ambulance class action may well be the ‘more suitable case’ to 
establish a tort of invasion of privacy in Australian common law. 
 
Finally, by restricting its scope to ‘personal information’, the notification scheme may not be 
sufficiently forward-looking to developments such as the Internet of Things (IoT). There are 
ambiguities over whether data collected by IoT devices will constitute ‘personal information’ 
for the purposes of the Privacy Act. While in the EU, data protection authorities seem to 
consider that most data collected by IoT devices would be attributable to individuals and thus 
‘personal data’,189 the situation in Australia after the recent Federal Court decision in Privacy 
Commissioner v Telstra casts doubt on whether that would also be the case here.190 Since the 
notification requirement only applies to ‘personal information’, this may well entail that only 
part of the proliferation of data gathered by IoT devices would be subject to this requirement. 
The legislation also does not address data breaches which involve the exposure of 
commercially sensitive information protected by trade secrets and other proprietary data 
regimes.191 
 
 
7.2 International comparisons 
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There are a number of points of comparative analysis for the new Australian requirements and 
overall situation as compared to those in the US and EU detailed above. Firstly, certain 
substantive features of the schemes are compared, namely the data covered and the trigger for 
notification. Then, the overall models presented by the different jurisdictions’ schemes. 
 
7.2.1 Substantive Provisions 
 
Through the various schemes detailed in this article in Australia, the United States and 
European Union, two substantive points of comparison can be identified: the kind of data which 
is covered by the data breach notification scheme, and the triggering event for notification. 
 
Regarding the data covered by the data breach notification schemes above, even schemes which 
cover data about individuals vary somewhat in what precisely this data comprises. The 
Australian scheme covers certain breaches of ‘personal information’ (‘information or an 
opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable’),192 
while the EU GDPR notification requirements concern ‘personal data’ (‘any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’).193 While these terms and their 
definitions may seem largely similar, the aforementioned Federal Court decision in Privacy 
Commissioner v Telstra casts doubt over whether ‘personal information’ covers as expansive 
a range of data as ‘personal data’ in the EU. The issue of what data or information is covered 
by data breach notification schemes becomes more complex in the US, where ‘personally 
identifiable information’, a central concept in information privacy laws there, does not have a 
uniform definition across the different state and federal laws.194 This can be seen in the kinds 
of data or information which are specifically listed, and thus covered by data breach notification 
provisions, in some of the statues discussed above in Section 4.1. These lists of specific types 
of data usually result in a more restricted amount of relevant data types in US laws compared 
to the EU and Australia’s definitions of personal data and personal information respectively. 
However, the advantage of the approach of some US statutes to listing specific types of 
information is that there is some clarity as to what information is covered; the challenge of the 
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broader EU and Australian approaches lies in their application to contemporary data practices, 
and the fact that it is possible to re-identify de-identified information, thus rendering potentially 
large and contextual the pool of ‘personal information’ or ‘personal data’.   
 
The trigger for notification of a data breach can also be compared across the different 
jurisdictions. The Australian data breach notification requirements may actually position 
Australia as a leading jurisdiction on the topic of strong data security measures on a literal 
reading of the legislation, since an entity may be obliged to inform of a breach if it ‘believes’ 
one to have taken place, and not just after it discovers such a breach has taken place.195 
(Although part of the trigger for notification in the Australian legislation is that a reasonable 
person would conclude that the unauthorised access or disclosure of information would be 
likely to result in ‘serious harm’ to individuals.) This can be contrasted with the EU GDPR 
scenario, where individuals whose personal data or privacy would be ‘adversely affected’ must 
be informed of a breach. Thus it seems that a higher threshold of harm must be suffered for the 
Australian notification requirement to be triggered. Then, Australian entities need only take 
‘reasonable steps’ to inform individuals of such breaches, whereas the obligation to inform 
individuals in the EU legislation is less qualified. Here, the wording of the Australian 
legislation may be conceptualised as closer to the ‘risk-based’ approach taken by US data 
breach notification requirements, where the possible consequences of the breach, or the risk 
that adverse consequences may occur, can be a factor in triggering notification. The EU’s 
GDPR data breach notification requirements on its face seems less qualified, although how 
breached data being ‘adversely affected’ is conceptualised may also involve an assessment of 
risk in practice. 
 
The extent to which these legislative divergences actually translate into practice in Australia, 
the EU and the American jurisdictions remains to be seen. It may well be that these differences 
are academic, and in practice the different jurisdictions deal very similarly with similar data 
breach scenarios. However, these legislative differences may still matter, given the GDPR’s 
extra-territorial reach: its provisions purport to apply to data processors and controller located 
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outside of the EU which process the data of EU citizens.196 This has sparked debate in Australia 
about Australian businesses’ compliance with the GDPR if they process EU citizens’ data, 
including as regards data breach notification given the different formal standards in these two 
jurisdictions.197 An Australian entity which suffers a data breach may in theory have to comply 
with both the new data notification obligation in Australia, and the notification obligation under 
the GDPR if it is processing EU citizens’ data. Yet a scenario is conceivable, for instance, in 
which the GDPR notification is triggered by a breach but those same circumstances do not 
trigger the Australian legislative notification obligation.  
 
 
7.2.2 Models 
 
As an amendment to the ‘Privacy Act’, the Australian legislative introduction of data breach 
notification may be conceptualised as being closer to the European than American model in its 
form, with data breach notification requirements included in its own data privacy laws (firstly 
the ePrivacy Directive, and then the GDPR). The fact that the Australian legislation is also 
limited in application to data breaches involving personal information is also similar to the 
European approach in its data privacy legislation. One divergence is that Australia does not 
have mandatory data breach notification laws for non-personal information-related data 
breaches, unlike the NIS Directive and eIDAS Regulation in the EU.  
 
Furthermore, the federal legislation in Australia and harmonised law at the regional level in the 
EU are closer models than the fragmented state-by-state approach to mandatory data breach 
notification legislation in the US – although it is important to note, as mentioned above, that 
the state- and territory-level information privacy regimes in Australia do not currently include 
their own respective data breach notification obligations.  
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Yet the sector-specific approach to data breach notification, prominent in the US, is not entirely 
absent in the EU, as discussed above, with data breach notification requirements found in other 
pieces of legislation beyond the core data privacy instruments. In Australia, the only other main 
legislative data breach notification requirement is found in the ‘My Health Records Act’. It 
would be prudent for Australia, in considering any future data breach notification requirements, 
to ensure sector-specific fragmentation is avoided, as well as fragmentation as regards state-
level obligations. 
 
The US model of data breach notification legislation and its more general approach to data 
breaches, including the role of litigation, may, at a more conceptual level, be viewed as more 
clearly instrumentalist to the aim of avoiding or mitigating cybercrime - rather than the 
protection of personal data or information for its own sake, an approach which may be reflected 
more in the rights-based EU model. Nevertheless, it may well be that the EU GDPR’s data 
breach notification provisions are enforced in a more instrumentalist fashion, where there are 
high risks to personal data security such as cybercrime. It may also the case that this is what 
will happen too in Australia. Given the novelty of both the GDPR and the Australian 
provisions, the extent to which a risk-based instrumentalist approach is taken, or not, can only 
be assessed once their practical implementation has taken place. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the new data breach notification requirements in Australian federal 
law against a backdrop of cybersecurity concerns more generally, the unique domestic 
conditions of data privacy legislation in Australia, and similar laws in other jurisdictions, 
namely the US and EU. Overall, the introduction of data breach notification requirements is to 
be welcomed from a data privacy and security perspective, with some evidence of positive 
impact, although the legislation has various deficiencies.  
 
The introduction of data breach notification obligations in Australia is consistent with 
international trends for these obligations. However, from the perspective of transnational 
businesses and other entities, compliance with these obligations in different jurisdictions may 
prove complicated and burdensome given the lack of international alignment of these measures, 
and even a lack of harmonisation within jurisdictions, as can be seen from the discussion in 
this article.  
 
While this article has provided a comparative context for Australian data breach notification 
requirements with analogous requirements in the two major Western jurisdictions of the US 
and EU, the adoption of cybersecurity legislation in China including data breach notification 
requirements, is a significant development in the Asia Pacific region and may further 
complicate compliance for businesses operating transnationally. However the current regional 
free trade agreement negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), including inter alia Australia and China, and the likelihood this agreement will 
include digital economy matters, may result in some harmonised standards on this topic at least 
in the Asia Pacific region.198  
 
As cybersecurity matters become more prominent on political and business agenda in Australia 
and internationally, data security is likely to increase in importance, and may be subject to 
further legislative reform in Australia and other jurisdictions. Further research would be 
illuminating on the implementation, impact and efficacy of data breach notification 
requirements in Australia, and the extent to which differing standards in different jurisdictions 
impose burdens on entities operating transnationally, in order to guide future legislators and 
policymakers. 
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